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Abstract—We present the design, implementation and eval-
uation of a system, called MATRIX, developed to protect the
privacy of mobile device users from location inference and sensor
side-channel attacks. MATRIX gives users control and visibility
over location and sensor (e.g., Accelerometers and Gyroscopes)
accesses by mobile apps. It implements a PrivoScope service that
audits all location and sensor accesses by apps on the device
and generates real-time notifications and graphs for visualizing
these accesses; and a Synthetic Location service to enable users
to provide obfuscated or synthetic location trajectories or sensor
traces to apps they find useful, but do not trust with their
private information. The services are designed to be extensible
and easy for users, hiding all of the underlying complexity from
them. MATRIX also implements a Location Provider component
that generates realistic privacy-preserving synthetic identities
and trajectories for users by incorporating traffic information
using historical data from Google Maps Directions API, and
accelerations using statistical information from user driving
experiments. The random traffic patterns are generated by mod-
eling/solving user schedule using a randomized linear program
and modeling/solving for user driving behavior using a quadratic
program. We extensively evaluated MATRIX using user studies,
popular location-driven apps and machine learning techniques,
and demonstrate that it is portable to most Android devices
globally, is reliable, has low-overhead, and generates synthetic
trajectories that are difficult to differentiate from real mobility
trajectories by an adversary.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile smartphones are presently the primary means for
users globally to communicate, access information and even
interact with the physical environment. These devices are
equipped with an increasingly large number of precise and
sophisticated sensors. These sensors vastly improve the quality
of the user’s interaction with the environment, but also pose
significant threats for privacy breaches as they directly or indi-
rectly leak private information about their users. The leakage
of location information from the GPS sensor, for instance,
has been a fast growing privacy concern. The commercial
GPS hardware available in modern smartphones is capable
of triangulating a user’s position within an accuracy of 3
meters. This leakage enables more sophisticated threats such
as tracking users, identity discovery, and identification of home
and work locations.
Motivation: The current protections against location tracking
mostly revolve around obfuscating the users’ location. Several
research works have proposed solutions that induce noise in
the location data [1], [2], [3], [4], [5]. Others have devised
solutions that sends the real location with several dummy
locations or within a data-set, and uses the response pertaining
to the real location [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11]. Others have
proposed stripping off all identifying information about a user
before sending the real location data in order to protect the
user’s privacy [12], [13]. Unfortunately, these solutions still
leak information about their users and can be combined with
other information (e.g., census data) to infer user identities and
their locations [14], [15]. Moreover, incomplete or incorrect
implementations of these solutions make them vulnerable to
location discovery attacks. Mobile operating systems also try
to prevent undesired location tracking by implementing per-
missions that all apps must request for accessing location data.
These measures, however, are not very effective in preventing
location tracking because users are unaware of an app’s
privacy practices and are often careless about granting such
permissions. Also, no protections exist against sensor side-
channels (e.g., from Accelerometers and Gyroscopes) even
when they are now known to leak location information [16],
[17], [18], [19], [20].
An alternative protection against location tracking is the
generation of synthetic location trajectories [21], [22] that are
independent of users real locations [23], [24]. These trajec-
tories guarantee location privacy because it is not possible
to derive the user’s location from them, however, they risk
denial of service if an adversary detects that the trajectories
are fake. To be effective against detection, these trajectories
must emulate real movements and routes by incorporating real
user transitions, movement schedules, traffic information and
driving behavior. Synthetic, yet realistic, mobility trajectories
are important as they have the potential to eliminate privacy
leaks and also enable the understanding of how users’ location
information is exploited by mobile apps.
Approach: The proposed MATRIX system is designed to
address privacy protection weaknesses in Android. To de-
tect leakage from location and sensor data, it implements a
PrivoScope service to monitor and analyze apps patterns for
accessing location and sensor APIs. PrivoScope provides users
with real-time notifications and a graphical interface to display
how apps access their location information and permissionless
sensors (e.g., the time of location access, the accuracy of
the location data received, the rate a sensor was sampled,
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and whether the app was in foreground or background). The
service is designed to hide all the underlying complexity
from the users and provide them an intuitive interface to
help them make more privacy informed decisions about pro-
viding synthetic location data to apps using MATRIX or
uninstalling/disabling apps they do not trust. PrivoScope also
implements a permission-protected API that allows security
apps installed on the device to get real-time information about
which apps access private location and sensors information.
To protect against leakage of location data, MATRIX im-
plements a Synthetic Location Service that gives users the
capability of setting their privacy preferences for each installed
app. The service dynamically and seamlessly sandboxes apps
installed on the device to receive obfuscated or synthetic feeds
as specified by the user. The synthetic feeds are generated
such that they are difficult to distinguish from real ones by
an adversary. To this end, we model user identities and their
movements between locations through Finite State Machines
(FSM) with probabilistic transitions connecting states. The
transitions between states represent routes that are generated
from graphs constructed from real road networks. These
synthetic routes are made realistic by generating a randomized
schedule (path in the FSM) using Linear Programming that
satisfies each state’s preferences in terms of time spent,
and expected arrival in those states. We further incorporate
traffic information from historical traffic APIs such as Google
Maps Directions API, generate accelerations and speeds using
Quadratic Programming based on statistical information from
user driving behavior, and also add noise to the synthetic data
to emulate real GPS data, in addition to incorporating walk
times and idle times.
Contributions: Our contributions are as follows:
• MATRIX is the first system, to the best of our knowledge,
to implement an efficient and extensible auditing system
for the Android ecosystem. It audits all location and
sensor accesses by all apps on the device to detect
leakages, generates real-time notifications and graphs for
visualizing these accesses in an easy and intuitive manner.
• MATRIX gives users the capability to change their pri-
vacy preferences and provide obfuscated or synthetic
trajectories to installed apps. It is the first system, in
our knowledge, to generate realistic synthetic identities
and trajectories to protect users’ privacy. We show that
generating such trajectories is feasible by incorporating
traffic information. The trajectories are randomized yet
satisfy realistic schedule constraints using a randomized
linear program, and match statistical characteristics of
user driving behavior using a quadratic program.
• MATRIX is an extensible system integrated within An-
droid without modifications to the operating system,
nor requires rooting. It will be extended to incorporate
other sensitive APIs, e.g., Wi-Fi, Telephony, Camera and
Microphones to provide users a holistic view of accesses
to their private information. It can also be used by security
apps and researchers to identify which apps misuse/leak
private location and sensors information, by analyzing
an app’s accesses and injecting synthetic honey-data to
observe if it is used in contexts not authorized by users.
• We extensively evaluated MATRIX to validate system
performance and reliability, and realism of synthetic tra-
jectories. Testing 1000 popular Android apps, we report
negligible impact in performance and reliability. For 10
popular location-driven apps, we report that MATRIX
is undetected while at least one app could detect non-
MATRIX mobility patterns. Our user study involving
100 users indicates that the synthetic trajectories are
difficult to differentiate from real traces visually, with
more users confusing synthetic trajectories to be real.
Our machine learning evaluation indicates that most well-
known algorithms fail to differentiate between real and
synthetic trajectories with an average accuracy of 50%
(comparable to an algorithm that uses a coin-flip), with
just one algorithm achieving an accuracy of 63% in
guessing if a trajectory is synthetic.
II. LOCATION PRIVACY IN ANDROID
This section provides a background on Android location and
sensor APIs, the current Android privacy protection schemes
and their weaknesses.
A. Android Location & Sensor APIs
The MATRIX system audits all location and sensor accesses
and updates the location information reported to an app in
some contexts. There are a standard set of Android APIs that
provide this information.
Location information can be accessed using four
different APIs. The LocationManager is the
default API available in all versions of the Android
SDK. The FusedLocationProviderClient,
FusedLocationProviderApi (deprecated) and
LocationClient (deprecated) are provided by Google
Play services as recommended closed source alternatives
that consume less battery for higher accuracy data. All
these APIs contain request* and remove* calls (e.g.,
requestLocationUpdates in LocationManager)
that enable apps to register and unregister for continuous
location updates. Once registered, location information is sent
asynchronously to the listeners based on the criteria set by the
app (e.g., quality, rate, latency). These managers also contain
additional methods such as getLastKnownLocation
in LocationManager that can return a location update
immediately.
Sensor information (e.g., Accelerometers and Gyroscopes)
can be accessed using the SensorManager API. It is
important to note that access to these sensors does not require
permissions in any versions of Android. Also, these sensors
can be accessed by apps in the background without any
notification or visual cues to the user.
B. Weaknesses in Privacy Protections
Android implements some location privacy protection
schemes to give users the capability to control how and
whether certain apps can access their location information.
These schemes are not sufficient for protecting a user’s privacy.
Some of the weaknesses are discussed below. Note that these
weaknesses are labeled (W#) for ease of referring to them in
the next section.
Weak Permissions Model (W1): Android specifies
two permissions for limiting access to the user’s
location information: ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION and
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION. The former allows apps
to access high accuracy location information, while the
latter provides obfuscated information to hide the user’s real
location. The permissions model is a good step in notifying
users of location access, however, this protection is limited as
users have an option to always allow access. This means that
the user will not be notified about location access again even
if the app’s context has changed, i.e., location is accessed
from another activity or from a service, or a previously
benign app is updated with a privacy intrusive version.
Non-existent Auditing Capabilities (W2): Android does not
provide a framework to audit how apps access a user’s private
information. Also, App stores (e.g., Google Play Store) do not
provide enough information about the privacy practices of an
app. Without any privacy-related knowledge, users are more
than likely to install and use an app if they require the services
provided by that app.
Weak Location Activity Notification (W3): The Android
operating system displays a notification icon on the notifi-
cation bar of the device, whenever any app requests contin-
uous location updates. An adversary can easily bypass this
protection by using an alternative method for location ac-
cess. One example is the getLastKnownLocation call in
LocationManager which can be invoked numerous times
for receiving continuous location updates. Another example
is exploiting the permissionless sensors like Accelerometers,
Gyroscopes and Barometers to infer user locations. Both
these methods do not display any notifications of access.
Furthermore, the notification simply indicates that some app
has access to location and no further information is given to
the user to make privacy-aware decisions.
Restricted Privacy Preferences (W4): Android does not pro-
vide the capability for users to define their privacy preferences
for apps installed on their device. Users can deny location
access to certain apps by disallowing location permissions,
however, certain apps may then deny service to the users.
There are situations in which users may not wish to disclose
their locations, in particular at some moments in time, and still
require the services of the app. One example of this is when
the app is turned-off or in the background.
Weak Location Granularity Settings (W5): Android
implements a location obfuscation scheme that hides
a user’s real location from apps requiring just the
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION permission. This obfuscated
location still leaks information about the user’s location. There
is currently no mechanism for users to completely hide their
location by providing synthetic information to untrusted apps.
III. HIGH-LEVEL APPROACH
MATRIX is an extensible system designed to address sev-
eral location privacy protection weaknesses in Android. It uses
the Android design paradigms for easy integration into the
Android ecosystem with minimal changes. MATRIX hides all
implementation complexity from the end-users to make the
system easy to use and intuitive. The system comprises of three
modules: an App-activity PrivoScope Service, a Synthetic
Location Service, and a Synthetic Location Provider.
The App-activity PrivoScope Service monitors and analyzes
apps patterns of location and sensor API accesses. It is
designed for end-users, researchers and security apps desiring
to assess the privacy posture of installed apps on the device.
To the best of our knowledge, this service is currently the
only one to provide an efficient auditing capability in Android.
End-users can view all location and sensor access information
as intuitive graphs. Other apps can get real-time audit events
via a permission protected secure API (W2). The service also
displays real-time visual notifications of location and sensor
access activity to users. The notification bar is updated when-
ever any app accesses these sensors and displays information
about which apps are actively accessing what sensors on the
device (W3). The architecture of PrivoScope is described in
Section IV-B.
The Synthetic Location Service provides an interface to the
user to set their location privacy preferences for all installed
apps. This service implements three settings for location gran-
ularity: Block level, City level and Synthetic Locations (W4).
The architecture of this service is described in Section IV-C.
The last module, the Synthetic Location Provider provides
the Synthetic Location Service obfuscated/synthetic locations
whenever the service requests for it. To the best of our
knowledge, this provider is currently the only one to generate
realistic privacy-preserving synthetic identities and mobility
trajectories for protecting users’ privacy (W5). The techniques
for modeling synthetic identities and movements are described
in Section V.
The Synthetic Location Service relies on the default An-
droid permission manager for managing location permissions,
however, it restricts location access to background apps by
default. Instead of completely denying location information, it
detects if the requesting app is in the background and provides
it the last location fix that the app received in foreground to
prevent it from tracking users (W1).
Figure 1 shows how MATRIX integrates into the Android
ecosystem. The PrivoScope Service and Synthetic Location
Service are implemented as system services that start at device
boot and are registered in the system server registry. These
services implement all the protections that ensure that only
authorized apps can use their functions. Apps installed on
the device interact with these services using APIs provided
by the PrivoScope Manager and Synthetic Location Manager.
These managers are loaded into each app’s process and
communicate with the corresponding services. At the user
level, MATRIX implements a PrivoScope GUI that provides
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Fig. 1: MATRIX integration into the Android ecosystem.
a graphical interface to the users to analyze the app’s privacy
practices, and a Location Preference GUI that enables users
to set their location privacy preferences. These also use the
PrivoScope and Synthetic Location Managers to communicate
with the corresponding system services.
IV. MATRIX ARCHITECTURE
This section describes the architecture of the Privo-
Scope and Synthetic Location services implemented for the
MATRIX framework.
A. API Call Interception
Previous mitigation systems (excluding Boxify [25]) were
implemented by either modifying the Android source code,
using rooted devices, or using third party frameworks
such as the Xposed Framework [26]. The Xposed frame-
work adds an extended app_process executable in the
/system/bin folder of the device on installation. This
extended app_process adds an additional jar file to the
classpath and calls methods even before the main method of
Zygote is called. This enables apps to intercept method calls
that are otherwise inaccessible from an app’s process.
MATRIX uses the Xposed framework to intercept location
and sensor API calls. One example usage in our context is
intercepting the requestLocationUpdates method of
LocationManager to generate an event every time an app
requests location updates. This event contains all the relevant
information about the request and sent to PrivoScope for
(a) PrivoScope Notification Bar (b) App Selection Activity
(c) App Detail Activity (d) Accelerometer Timeline
Fig. 2: Example screenshots of the PrivoScope GUI.
logging and notification. Using the framework is both nec-
essary and advantageous due to the following reasons: (1)
Xposed has the capability to intercept external APIs like
Google Play Services which is currently not possible by
modifying the Android source or by rooting, (2) the framework
is supported and has a consistent API for different versions
of Android ensuring portability and ease of development,
and (3) the framework does not require a rooted device to
function properly. We developed a simple tool that automates
the installation of Xposed and MATRIX through a custom
recovery (e.g., TWRP [27]) without rooting the device. The
Xposed framework and TWRP recovery are both open-source
and consistently analyzed and updated by a large community
of Android users, making them quite reliable.
B. The App-activity PrivoScope Service
At a high level, the PrivoScope service uses the Xposed
framework to intercept all location and sensor APIs, generates
events containing the audit details, adds the events to a
database and displays real-time usage notifications to the end-
user. The service also exposes a permission protected API that
other security apps can register to get real-time and archived
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Fig. 3: Architecture diagram of the PrivoScope service.
audit events. It also implements a GUI interface for the users to
analyze app behavior on their device. The motivation is to help
users make privacy aware decisions regarding installed apps.
Figure 2 shows example screenshots of the PrivoScope GUI,
where Figure 2a shows the PrivoScope real-time location and
sensor usage notification, Figure 2b shows a list of installed
apps sorted by most recent access of location and sensor APIs,
Figure 2c shows links to an app’s permissions and access
details, and Figure 2d shows a timeline of Accelerometer
access by an app at different times. This timeline can be
set to display accesses in the past month, week, day, or a
custom number of hours. Note that an app’s life-cycle is
color coded to help users differentiate between foreground and
background accesses. Here, blue indicates that the app was in
the foreground while gray would indicate background access.
The evaluation and performance analysis of PrivoScope is
reported in Section VI-B.
The architecture of the PrivoScope service for
a requestLocationUpdate method call from
LocationManager is shown in Figure 3. Note that
we abstract away from the low level implementation details
and Android’s internal complexities in this paper for
simplification. Also note that the architecture is generic
across all location managers and the sensor manager and we
use LocationManager here just for illustration purposes.
Like all other Android services, PrivoScope implements
a manager called PrivoScopeManager that exposes
public APIs to other apps and a system service called
PrivoScopeService that performs all the security
sensitive operations and checks if apps have appropriate
access rights for their services.
The control flows like this: An app requests continu-
ous location updates using the requestLocationUpdate
method call from LocationManager. The manager and
the privileged LocationManagerService validate the
app’s access by checking its requested permissions 1©. Once
access is validated, the API call interception service generates
an event containing all relevant information to be logged
for auditing. All private user information contained by the
request are ignored. For example, this specific event would
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Fig. 4: Architecture diagram of the Synthetic Location service.
contain the system time, the app package name, the ac-
tivity invoking the request, whether the app is background
or foreground, the requested location provider, and the re-
quested accuracy and sampling rate 2©. This event is then
sent to the PrivoScopeManager for logging using an
addAuditEvent method call exposed by the manager
3©. The PrivoScopeManager forwards this event to the
PrivoScopeService which validates whether the pack-
age name in the event is the same as the package name
of the app making the request. This ensures security as
only apps generating an event can add the event. The event
is discarded if the package names do not match and a
SecurityException is thrown. In case of a successful
match, the event is added to the service’s database 4©. The
PrivoScopeService also sends this event to a Notifi-
cation service that keeps track of all active apps accessing
location and sensor APIs and updates the notification bar with
this new event information 5©. The PrivoScopeManager
exposes a requestAuditEvents method call that other
apps on the device can register for receiving real-time audit
events. This call is protected using a custom permission called
GET_AUDIT_EVENTS and apps must request this permission
for access. The PrivoScopeManager sends the event to all
registered apps that receive this event asynchronously using
a AuditEventListener callback interface 6©. Based on
whether this event was successfully added to the database
or not, the addAuditEvent method call returns a boolean
value to the LocationManager 7©. Note that steps 3© to
7© execute in a new thread to ensure that the app functionality
and the performance is not impacted by PrivoScope. After step
3©, the requestLocationUpdate method call simply
terminates as its return type is a void. The other method calls
and managers return the expected values and their functionality
is not updated by PrivoScope 8©.
C. The Synthetic Location Service
The architecture of the Synthetic Location service is shown
in Figure 4, again in the context of receiving location up-
dates from the LocationManager API. Like PrivoScope,
this architecture is generic across all the location man-
agers. The Synthetic Location service implements a man-
ager called SyntheticLocationManager that exposes
public APIs to other apps and a system service called
SyntheticLocationService that manages and pro-
tects the database storing the user location preferences, and
connects with the LocationProvider to request obfus-
cated/synthetic locations.
The control flows like this: When an app requests
continuous location updates (with the correct permis-
sions) using the requestLocationUpdates call from
LocationManager, the first steps that occur are the listener
registration (cf. Section II-A) and addition of the audit event
to the PrivoScope service’s database (cf. Section IV-B). 1©,
2©. After registration is completed, all the location fixes
generated by the LocationManagerService are typi-
cally sent asynchronously to the app’s LocationListener,
PendingIntent or LocationCallback implementa-
tion. In MATRIX, these location fixes are intercepted by a
LocationListenerProxy that proxies it to the app’s
listener. The proxy works by hooking the Location ob-
ject that is used by all the managers to send location
fixes to the app’s listener. This enables it to modify the
location object before the app loads the information us-
ing the get* method calls (e.g., getLatitude() and
getLongitude()) 3©. The LocationListenerProxy
requests the SyntheticLocationManager to provide an
updated location for the app, based on the app’s location
preference set by the user. The manager forwards this re-
quest to the SyntheticLocationService that maintains
and protects the database storing the user location prefer-
ence for each app 4©. The SyntheticLocationService
looks up the user’s location preferences in the database,
and communicates with the LocationProvider to request
an obfuscated/synthetic location if the user has chosen to
receive such location information for the app. The default
preference set for an app requesting fine location is block
level obfuscated data (500m) 5©. An updated location object
is returned to the SyntheticLocationService which
forwards it to the SyntheticLocationManager. The
SyntheticLocationManager sends this location to the
LocationListenerProxy that updates it before the app
accesses the location 6©, 7©.
The Synthetic Location service currently provides four set-
tings for per-app location privacy: High Accuracy, Block Level
Accuracy, City Level Accuracy, and Synthetic Locations. Note
that the High Accuracy and Block Level Accuracy options
are only available for apps requesting fine location using
the ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION permission. This is because
apps that use ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION permissions
already receive coarser location data than that provided by
the two options. The high accuracy option set for an app tells
the service to not obfuscate or synthesize locations for this
app. For block level and city level accuracy, we extended
the default Android LocationFudger implementation to
support different grid resolutions. The implementation is in
com.android.server.location.LocationFudger
(a) Real Location (b) App Selection Activity
(c) Location Preference (d) Synthetic Location
Fig. 5: Example screenshots of the Synthetic Location GUI.
under the Android source tree [28]. We analyzed this code
to find that the real location information is obfuscated in
two steps. First, a random offset is applied to the location
to mitigate against accurate detection of grid transitions when
a user crosses a grid boundary. This offset is changed slowly
over time (e.g., once every hour) to mitigate against location
inference attacks. Second, the primary means of obfuscation
is to snap the offset data (already mitigated against grid
transitions) to a grid. This grid radius chosen by most recent
versions of Android is 2000m. We found this technique to be
effective against location inference attacks. The current grid
radius settings for block level and city level accuracy are 500m
and 5000m, respectively.
Figure 5 shows screenshots, illustrating the Synthetic Loca-
tion service for a GPS tracking app. Note that this app is used
for demonstrating how the service works because it displays
the user location on the screen, and it is not a malicious app.
Figure 5a shows the test app displaying the user’s real location,
Figure 5b shows the list of installed apps that request location
permissions, Figure 5c shows the location privacy preference
for the test app being changed to synthetic, and Figure 5d
shows the test app now displaying a synthetic location in
another city. This synthetic location is provided based on the
time of the day and a realistic GPS trajectory generated for
the user for that specific day.
V. GENERATING SYNTHETIC IDENTITIES
This section provides a detailed description of our technique
for generating unique and realistic privacy-preserving synthetic
identities and mobility trajectories for each user using the
MATRIX system.
A. Modeling User States
A user’s synthetic mobility patterns are defined as an
automated probabilistic state machine with a finite set of
S states Q = {Q0, . . . , QS−1}. The states, in this context,
represent a set of tuples {(Loc(Qi), tmin,i, amin,i, amax,i)},
where Loc(Qi) is the geographic coordinates of state Qi,
tmin,i is the minimum time spent in the state, and amin,i,
amax,i are the lower and upper time bounds for arrival at the
state. The geographic coordinates of the states are obtained
from OpenStreetMap by parsing the ‘building’ and ‘amenity’
tags [29], [30] of all ways and nodes for the given area.
For instance, a ‘Home’ state can be chosen as a way or
node in OpenStreetMap whose building type is one of the
following: ‘apartments’, ‘house’, ‘residential’, or ‘bungalow’.
Similarly, a ‘Work’ state can be chosen from the ‘commercial’
or ‘industrial’ tags. The other attributes are used for scheduling
the user’s activity for each day and set based on typical times
that these activities occur. Note that the attributes are set to
default values when they are unimportant for a state, i.e.,
tmin,i = 0, amin,i = 00:00:00, and amax,i = 23:59:59.
In the simplest form, a state machine may contain just two
synthetic states Q = {Q0, Q1}, where Q0 = ‘Home’ and Q1 =
‘Work’. We label these as significant states as the user spends
most of their time in one of these states. The geographic
coordinates Loc(Q0) and Loc(Q1) are randomly chosen from
the list of all locations with the relevant tags. Assuming no
‘Work from Home’ scenarios, the probabilities P (Q0) and
P (Q1) of occurrence of these states is taken to be 1.
The state machine is made more realistic by adding syn-
thetic states like Q2 = ‘School’, Q3 = ‘Gas Station’, Q4
= ‘Lunch’ and Q5 = ‘Dinner’. We label these as tran-
sitional states because a user will temporarily visit these
states when transitioning between significant states (i.e., Q0
and Q1). For any transitional state Qi, the geographic co-
ordinates Loc(Qi) is selected from a set of locations Loc
= {Loc1, . . . , LocN} with the relevant tags, such that its
distance is shortest from the significant states, i.e., Loc(Qi) =
arg minL∈Loc d(L,Loc(Q0)) + d(L,Loc(Q1)). Note that, un-
like significant states, visits to transitional states are occasional
based on some specific frequency of occurrence. This fre-
quency, denoted by fi, is derived from a uniform distribution
U(l, u) with l and u as the bounds for the frequency of visits
to that state (e.g., once a week to once a month). In case
of ‘Gas Station’ specifically, the system chooses a random
mileage m and gas capacity c, and calculates the frequency as
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Fig. 6: Example of a simplified finite state machine simulating
a user’s movements based on some transition probabilities.
the number of days a user can travel between the significant
states before the gas level goes below 1/4th of capacity, i.e.,
f3 = int(
0.75mc
d(Loc(Q0),Loc(Q1))+d(Loc(Q1),Loc(Q0))
). Assuming W
workdays in a year, the probability of occurrence for any tran-
sitional state Qi is then calculated as P (Qi) = (W/fi)/W .
The transition probability between states Qi and Qj , de-
noted by χi,j , is equivalent to the compound probability of the
two independent states, i.e., P (χi,j) = P (Qi)P (Qj). The fol-
lowing conditions determine if a state Qi can transition to state
Qj : (1) Qi is a significant state and the originating state for Qj ,
(2) Qj is a significant state and the destination state for Qi, or
(3) the two states originate from the same significant state Qs
and distance d(Loc(Qs),Loc(Qi)) < d(Loc(Qs),Loc(Qj)).
The significant states are always connected and their prob-
abilities are calculated as P (χ0,1) = 1 −
∑S−1
i=2 P (χ0,i)
and P (χ1,0) = 1 −
∑S−1
i=2 P (χ1,i), respectively. All other
transitions have a probability of 0.
Note that users can go for ‘Lunch’ in the afternoon and
‘Dinner’ in the evening from the ‘Work’ state. If we use the
same ‘Work’ state for both transitions, the probabilities are
split when they clearly are different transitions. To address
this, the ‘Work’ state is internally represented as two states:
Q1a for afternoon and Q1e for evening. Also note that the
model described here is for weekdays, and a similar model is
created for weekends with a different set of states (e.g., the
user may leave from ‘Home’ to watch a ‘Movie’, eat ‘Dinner’
and return ‘Home’).
Figure 6 provides an intuition for our automated finite state
machine model. This specific model comprises of 6 states Q =
{Q0, · · · , Q5} and their transition probabilities are shown. We
see that it is possible to transition from state Q0 to states Q1,
Q2 or Q3. As the transition probability P (χ0,1) is 0.78, the
model should typically choose state Q1 ≈ 8 times out of 10.
This makes sense as a user will mostly go to ‘Work’ from
‘Home’ but may sometimes need to drop their kids to ‘School’
or fill up gas at a ‘Gas Station’.
B. Modeling Mobility Trajectories
The finite state machine generated for each user is used to
synthesize mobility trajectories for the user every day. This is
a 3 step process: (1) synthesize the user states for the entire
day, (2) synthesize the schedule to satisfy the time constraints,
and (3) synthesize the trajectory based on the schedule.
Synthesizing the user states: The state machine of a user
is loaded every day to generate a route of the states the
user will visit that day. This route always starts and ends
at the initial state Q0 (‘Home‘) and traverses through Q1
(‘Work‘), i.e., R = [Q0, . . . , Q1, . . . , Q0]. The first state Q0
can transition to any connected state Qi based on the transition
probabilities of Q0. The state Qi can then transition to any of
its connected state Qj based on the transition probabilities
of Qi, and so forth forming a chain that ends at the final
state Q0. Note that the construction technique of the state
machine ensures that this route traverses through Q1. Let
P (χi) = {P (χi,0), . . . , P (χi,S−1)} denote the set of all
transitional probabilities of state Qi. To obtain the next state,
the system first derives a random transitional probability from
a uniform distribution P = U(0, 1). This probability P is then
compared with the cumulative probabilities of all transitions
in P (χi). A state Qj is selected if P lies between the previous
state’s cumulative probability and its cumulative probability,
i.e., P (X ≤ χi,j−1) < P ≤ P (X ≤ χi,j).
Synthesizing the schedule: A realistic schedule should
satisfy the time constraints set for every state in a user’s state
machine, such as arriving at work between 8am and 9am
or dropping children to school before 8:30am. The schedule
should also satisfy the amount of time spent in each state,
such as working for at least 8hrs. The schedule should also
account for the time spent in transitioning from one state to the
next, such as driving for 0.5hrs to get from home to work.
All these constraints can be formulated as linear equalities
or inequalities, therefore, defining the problem of scheduling
as a Linear Program (LP). Let tai and t
d
i be the arrival and
departure times at/from state Qi. The above constraints can
be formulated as follows: arriving at state Qi between 8am
and 9am is formulated as 8am < tai ≤ 9am, specifying that
the user works at least 8hrs is formulated as tdi+1− tai ≥ 8.0,
and the time spent in transitioning from home to work is
formulated as tai+1 − tdi = 0.5. Naturally, all the times are
specified in UTC for consistency and bounded by the day’s
limits (i.e., 00:00:00 - 23:59:59).
This set of linear equality and inequality constraints define
a convex polytope of all the schedules satisfying the state
constraints, and the transition time constraints between the
states. Let T = (ta1 , t
d
1, . . . , t
a
S , t
d
S) denote a vector of all the
arrival and departure time instants for a route containing S
states. One simple way of finding a point on this polytope is
by defining an objective function for the vector T with random
coefficients, i.e., c = (c1, . . . , cS) where ci ∈ [−1, 1]. Let
t(χi,j) denote the total time spent in transitioning between
two states Qi and Qj . Also, recall that tmin,i specifies the
minimum time spent in state Qi and amin,i, amax,i specify
the time bounds of arrival at the state (cf. Section V-A). Using
above attributes, the LP is formally defined as:
Maximize
S∑
i=1
(cit
a
i + cit
d
i ) where ci ∈ [−1, 1]
Subject to: amin,j < taj ≤ amax,j for j = 1, 2, . . . , S
tdj+1 − taj ≥ tmin,j for j = 1, 2, . . . , S − 1
taj+1 − tdj = t(χj,j+1) for j = 1, 2, . . . , S − 1
Solving this LP identifies a corner of the polytope but not
a random element within it. If the coefficients of the objective
function were repeated, the LP will output the same schedule.
To address this, we compute a random point within the poly-
tope by finding different corners of the polytope using random
coefficients and then computing a random linear combination
of these corners. More precisely, let C = {C1, . . . , CN}
denote a set of N corners of the polytope obtained using
random coefficients, and let r = {r1, . . . , rN} denote a set
of positive random numbers such that
∑N
i=1 ri = 1. The
random solution defining the user’s schedule for that day is
then calculated as Schedule =
∑N
i=1 riCi.
Note that as synthesizing the schedule using LP requires
pre-calculated transition times t(χi,j), the system calculates
this time using the ‘pessimistic’ traffic model of Google Maps
Directions API. The departure time is chosen as the mean of
the time constraints for the start state. This typically gives us a
worst case transition time between two states and can be used
for scheduling. Note that for synthesizing the final trajectory,
the ‘best guess’ traffic model is used which provides more
accurate traffic representation.
Synthesizing the route between two states: The route
between two synthetic states is generated using a graph
G = (V,E) constructed for the area. The system uses the
Dijkstra’s algorithm to find the fastest route between the states,
using the length and speed limit information present in each
vertex. The resulting route is split into multiple waypoints
based on turns and stop signs (extracted from OpenStreetMap).
These waypoints are given as input to the Google Maps
Directions API to obtain historical traffic information about the
route. The departure time is specified based on the schedule
generated for that day. The route obtained from the Google
API consists of multiple steps and can be represented as
R = [r1, . . . , rS ], where S denotes the number of steps.
Each step ri is attributed with geographic and traffic related
information ri = (B, dstep, tstep)i, where B is the list of
geographic coordinates of this step, dstep is the length of this
step, and tstep is the time to traverse this step.
To generate realistic trajectories, all steps of a route must
incorporate user driving behavior while also adhering to the
step’s traffic constraints, i.e., dstep and tstep. To understand
user driving behavior, we analyzed 400 driving routes collected
from 2 drivers and 4 phones (LG Nexus 5, LG Nexus 5X,
Samsung Note 4, and Google Pixel). These routes covered a
distance of ≈ 1400kms in a major city of USA consisting
of both highway and internal roads, as well as peak and
off-peak hours. The acceleration and speed information were
extracted from these routes for every second to analyze their
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Fig. 7: Distribution of the absolute values of accelerations for
both Real (µ = 0.61, M = 0.34, σ = 0.79) and Synthetic
(µ = 0.61, M = 0.32, σ = 0.78) routes.
distribution. We found the speeds to be randomly distributed,
however, the absolute values of accelerations approximate
to an exponential distribution (mean µ = 0.61, median
M = 0.34, and standard deviation σ = 0.79) shown in
Figure 7a. Note that the distribution is an approximation
and not truly exponential because µ < σ, where µ = σ is
a property of exponential distributions. Analyzing individual
routes, the range of means of absolute accelerations, denoted
by [ ¯|a|min, ¯|a|max], varied between 0.1m/s2 and 1.1m/s2.
The range of standard deviations of absolute accelerations,
denoted by [σ(|a|)min, σ(|a|)max], were between 0.4m/s2
and 1.1m/s2. The bounds of all acceleration values, denoted
by [amin, amax], were between −7m/s2 and 7m/s2. The
means of the accelerations were ≈ 0m/s2 for every route.
The above constraints can be formulated as a list of
equalities and inequalities, this time defining a non-linear
constraint optimization problem. Such problems can be solved
by using Sequential Quadratic Programming (SQP) methods.
Let a = (a1, . . . , aN ) denote a vector of acceleration values
for each step, where N denotes the travel time of the step,
i.e., N = int(tstep). Let v0 denote the initial speed coming
into this step and v = (v1, . . . , vN ) denote a vector of speeds
calculated from v0 and the vector a. The objective of this
optimization is to find an optimal vector a that minimizes
|v¯ − (dstep/tstep)| < ∆ to adhere to the traffic constraints,
where v¯ is the mean of vector v, and dstep, tstep represent
the step’s distance and time. The ∆ is a threshold that
determines whether the minimized objective function value
is acceptable. All rejected optimizations are retried with a
higher number of iterations till a valid solution satisfying
the threshold is found. We observed that this optimization
typically yields an optimal vector a that approaches the lower
mean bound of the absolute accelerations ¯|a|min, for most
optimizations. To address this, we derive a new lower mean
bound for every route from a uniform distribution and use
the following range for optimization: [ ¯|a|rand, ¯|a|max], where
¯|a|rand = U( ¯|a|min, ¯|a|max − δ), and δ is a small constant to
ensure that ¯|a|rand < ¯|a|max. The optimal vectors ai for every
step i are merged to represent the route’s accelerations. Note
that a bounded constraint of the form x1 ≤ x ≤ x2 can be
rewritten as (x2−x)(x−x1) ≥ 0 for simplifying the constraint
for the solver. Using above attributes, the route optimization
for each step is formally defined as:
Minimize |v¯ − (dstep/tstep)|
Subject to: a¯ = 0
( ¯|a|max − ¯|a|)( ¯|a| − ¯|a|rand) ≥ 0
(σ(|a|)max − σ(|a|))(σ(|a|)− σ(|a|)min) ≥ 0
σ(|a|)− ¯|a| ≥ 0
Bounds: amin ≤ aj ≤ amax for j = 1, 2, . . . , N
Some additional constraints applied to the optimization are
that v0 = 0 for the first step and vN = 0 for the last
step of the route. The optimization is improved by providing
an initial guess of bounded accelerations from a gaussian
distribution N (v¯′, 2), where µ = v¯′ is the mean step speed,
i.e., v¯′ = dstep/tstep, and σ = 2m/s is the standard deviation
of the speed. Figure 7b shows the distribution of the absolute
accelerations generated for synthetic trajectories. We can ob-
serve that the parameters and shape of the distribution closely
follows the parameters and shape of the real distribution.
Note that this work uses a linear model for synthesizing
walks from a state’s coordinates to a graph vertex, and vice
versa. The vertex containing a point nearest to the state’s
coordinates is chosen, and the driving route is started/stopped
at this point. This simple model assumes a constant walking
speed as our main focus was on driving. We plan to study
models for generating realistic walk patterns in the future. Also
note that as GPS accuracy varies, a small random gaussian
noise is added to each coordinate of the final trajectory.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate MATRIX using the following
metrics: the portability, stability and performance of the sys-
tem, and the detection of synthetic trajectories by popular
location-driven apps, by regular users, and by Machine Learn-
ing algorithms.
A. System Portability and Stability
MATRIX is compatible with Android KitKat and on-
wards. It has been tested to work on Xposed Framework API
versions 82 to 89 (current) which are compatible with the
above Android versions. This implies that MATRIX can be
ported to ≈ 94% of all Android devices globally (based on
information from the Android Dashboard [31] as of August
10, 2018).
The system’s stability was evaluated on 4 smartphones and
the results are shown in Table I. The evaluation was performed
using 1000 popular apps on Google Play Store that requested
location permissions or accessed the sensors. All the apps
had a minimum rating of 4.0 and a minimum vote count
of 10, 000 users. These 1000 apps were successively run
twice using an automated UI application exerciser tool called
Android Monkey [32], once on a stock Android version of
these smartphones and then with MATRIX installed on the
same phones. The tool was configured to stress test each app’s
activities to monitor how many additional apps crash or fail to
TABLE I: Results of the Stability evaluation for MATRIX us-
ing 1000 popular Android apps on 4 smartphones.
Phone Version Installed Success Failure
HTC One M7 Lollipop 1000 892 1081000 894 106
HTC One M9 Marshmallow 985 796 189985 791 194
LG Nexus 5 Lollipop 1000 938 621000 944 56
LG Nexus 5X Marshmallow 1000 851 1491000 848 152
execute. The same settings were used for both tests (seed = 1,
num events = 2500) to ensure that the same pseudo-random
events were generated.
The first row for each phone in Table I shows the test
results for the stock version and the second row shows
the test results for MATRIX. All the apps installed and
ran on every phone except for 15 apps on the HTC One
M9 (possibly due to compatibility reasons). The number of
successful monkey runs are very similar in both the tests
with the stock version performing better on two phones and
the MATRIX version performing better on the other two. We
analyzed the errors/crashes manually to check for Xposed or
MATRIX specific errors and did not find any. This validates
that MATRIX remains stable and runs as expected for different
devices, OS versions, apps and in heavy use.
B. System Performance
MATRIX was extensively evaluated for performance over-
heads occurring from the most expensive operations of the
system. We identified 3 potential performance bottlenecks in
our system: (1) the API call interception function using the
Xposed framework; (2) the add audit event function of the
PrivoScope service; and (3) the location provider function of
the Synthetic Location service. We implemented a test app that
invoked these functions 1 million times to test performance.
The execution time was calculated as the difference between
two System.nanoTime method calls placed immediately
before and after the function execution. The API interception
bottleneck is caused by the Xposed framework loading and
hooking method calls. To evaluate its performance, we created
an empty method inside our system and hooked it using the
Xposed framework.
Table II shows the mean µ, standard deviation σ and maxi-
mum time of execution for the three functions on a LG Nexus
5 and a LG Nexus 5X. The API interception function using
the Xposed framework averaged about µ = 0.2ms on both the
phones, which is negligible from a usage perspective. The add
audit event function of PrivoScope had a low µ for both the
phones (4.3ms and 3.2ms, resp), and its performance is also
acceptable. The location provider function of the Synthetic
Location service had a relatively higher µ and σ for the Nexus
5 (µ = 11.1ms, σ = 7.7ms). We believe this overhead is due
to database lookups performed by the service to check the
location preferences for the app. Overall, the entire system can
run with an average overhead of 15.6ms on the Nexus 5 and
TABLE II: Results of the Performance evaluation of MA-
TRIX for 2 smartphones.
Phone Service Mean (µ) Std (σ) Max
Nexus 5
Xposed Hook 0.2 ms 0.3 ms 17.1 ms
Add Audit Event 4.3 ms 3.8 ms 67.1 ms
Update Location 11.1 ms 7.7 ms 87.6 ms
Nexus 5X
Xposed Hook 0.2 ms 0.15 ms 5.7 ms
Add Audit Event 3.2 ms 1.6 ms 26.8 ms
Update Location 5.7 ms 1.5 ms 16.0 ms
9.1ms on the Nexus 5X which should have a negligible impact
on the user experience. The sum of worst case performances
overhead at 171.8ms on the Nexus 5 should also not affect
user experience since such overhead occurs rarely.
C. Detection of Synthetic Trajectories
1) Detection by Popular Mobile Apps: We evaluated this
metric using 10 popular location-driven apps (listed in Ta-
ble III) on Google Play Store. These apps rely heavily on
location data to provide their services to users. The evalu-
ation was performed by feeding these apps three types of
synthetic location data and monitoring their behavior. In test
1 (Synthetic), the synthetic trajectories were generated using
the techniques described in Section V-B. In test 2 (HS), the
trajectories from test 1 were time compressed by a factor of
5 such that the user appeared to move 5 times faster (e.g.,
at 300km/h in a 60km/h speed zone). In test 3 (HS+T),
the trajectories from test 2 were perturbed by large noises
(≈ 1000m) such that the user appeared to teleport to different
locations very quickly. The expected results was that apps that
detect fake location should be able to easily detect the HS and
HS+T trajectories, but not Synthetic trajectories.
Table III shows the results of the three tests for our test
apps. None of the apps were able to detect synthetic locations
in the Synthetic trajectories test. Even for HS and HS+T
trajectories test, with the exception of Ingress, none of the
other apps detected the presence of high speed and noisy
synthetic locations. Ingress did not ban us from playing the
game, however, it denied points when it detected that the
user was moving too fast or teleporting. Poke´mon Go is
also known to ban users, however, we did not get banned
during our tests even after capturing many Poke´mons using
the noisy data. This is likely because the ban threshold is
set to high to prevent users from going to a higher level
by cheating. All the remaining apps kept performing their
functions without detecting the presence of the synthetic data.
Note that Waze and Google Maps navigation operated properly
for HS but became unstable for HS+T, which was expected
as they constantly updated the routing information based on
the teleported locations.
These observations indicate that popular location-driven
apps fail to check validity of the received data. Some of
these apps (Ingress, Poke´mon Go, Foursquare and Google
Maps) check whether the MockLocationProvider [33]
is enabled on the device. Some apps rely on other schemes
to limit user abuse (e.g., Foursquare detects and limits rapid
TABLE III: Results of the Synthetic Trajectories detection test on 10 popular Android apps that rely on location data.
App Name Category Rating Synthetic High Speed (HS) HS+Teleport (HS+T)
Ingress Adventure Game 4.3 X Detected Detected
Poke´mon Go Adventure Game 4.1 X X X
Geocaching Health & Fitness 4.0 X X X
Glympse Social 4.5 X X X
Family Locator Lifestyle 4.4 X X X
happn Lifestyle 4.5 X X X
Yelp Travel & Local 4.3 X X X
Foursquare Food & Drink 4.1 X X X
Waze Maps & Navigation 4.6 X X Unstable
Google Maps Travel & Local 4.3 X X Unstable
(a) Real Driving Route
(b) Generated Synthetic Trajectory
Fig. 8: An example of the similarity between a real route and
a generated synthetic route.
TABLE IV: Cumulative results of the User Study on Mechan-
ical Turk sorted by the number of noisy trajectories correctly
labeled.
Noisy Surveyors Real Trajectories Synthetic Trajectories
Real Synthetic Real Synthetic
0 100 65.1% 34.9% 66.0% 34.0%
1 91 65.4% 34.6% 65.9% 34.1%
2 72 65.7% 34.3% 65.4% 34.6%
3 54 68.3% 31.7% 64.4% 35.6%
check-ins). This means that they rely on simple checks but
do not implement algorithms for detecting synthetic data. The
only app that checked location validity in our set was Ingress,
and it was unable to detect any discrepancies in the synthetic
trajectories generated by our system.
2) Detection by Regular Users: We evaluated this metric
by conducting two separate user studies: one comprising
of a group of 12 students from a university and another
comprising of 100 users from Amazon Mechanical Turk [34].
The intuition behind two studies was to understand the results
from two perspectives; one of users who know the area very
well and another of users unaware of the area. The university
area was chosen so that the students were aware of its traffic
congestions. The study asked the users to visually analyze a
mix of 20 real and synthetic trajectories and label them as
‘Real’ or ‘Synthetic’ based on their observations. Figures 8a
and 8b show an example of a real route and a synthetic
trajectory used for the study. The green marker marks the start
location, the white markers are 500m apart, and the red marker
marks the stop location. These markers display the time the
vehicle was at the given location.
The trajectories were created as follows: First, we drove
10 unique routes close to the university area, each starting
and ending at different locations and times of the day. Each
route can be represented as R = [n1, . . . , nL], where n is
a node and L is the number of nodes in the route. Each
node ni is attributed with timing and geographic information
ni = (ti,Loc(ni)), where ti is the timestamp and Loc(ni) is
the node’s geographic coordinates. Next, we generated 10 syn-
thetic routes similar to the 10 real routes using the timestamp
of the first node (i.e., t1) and geographic coordinates of the
end nodes (i.e., Loc(n1) and Loc(nL)) for each route R. The
trajectories were shuffled so they appeared in a random order.
For mechanical turk, we added three very noisy trajectories
which looked obviously synthetic to find users who did not
take the study seriously.
University Students Study: For the real trajectories, ≈
64.2% of the trajectories were labeled as ‘Real’ and the rest
were labeled as ‘Synthetic’. For the synthetic trajectories,
≈ 65.8% of the trajectories were labeled as ‘Real’ and the
rest were labeled as ‘Synthetic’. Note that more users of this
study confused the ‘Synthetic’ trajectories to be ‘Real’.
Amazon Mechanical Turk Study: For the real trajectories,
≈ 68.3% of the trajectories were labeled as ‘Real’ and the
rest were labeled as ‘Synthetic’. For the synthetic trajectories,
≈ 64.4% of the trajectories were labeled as ‘Real’. The
above results are for 54 users who detected all the obviously
noisy trajectories. Table IV shows the cumulative results of
the mechanical turk study based on the number of noisy
trajectories detected by the users. We can see that the results
are not significantly different even for all 100 users, however,
more users labeled ‘Synthetic’ as ‘Real’.
The results indicate that it was difficult for the users to
differentiate between synthetic and real driving trajectories.
There was confusion in both groups regarding their validity.
TABLE V: Results of the Machine Learning algorithms evalu-
ation showing the ‘Real’ and ‘Synthetic’ prediction accuracy.
Algorithm Real Trajectories Synthetic Trajectories
Real Synthetic Real Synthetic
Decision Trees 53% 47% 38% 62%
Random Forest 61% 39% 37% 63%
Nearest Neighbor 50% 50% 43% 57%
10 Nearest Neighbor 49% 51% 43% 57%
Naive Bayes 86% 14% 86% 14%
Neural Networks 95% 5% 96% 4%
SVM 5% 95% 3% 97%
Evaluating individual trajectories, we saw that this confusion
applied to each trajectory as not a single one was labeled as
‘Real’ or ‘Synthetic’ unanimously by all users.
3) Detection by Machine Learning Algorithms: We evalu-
ated this metric using the 400 routes collected for analyzing
user driving behavior (cf. Section V-B). These set of routes
were labeled as ‘Real’. For each real route, a corresponding
synthetic route was generated using the real route’s departure
time, and start and end locations. These set of routes were la-
beled as ‘Synthetic’. Note that the routes may have completely
different trajectories, therefore, extracting spatial features or
using the entire route for machine learning will generate
inaccurate models. As such, we extract only temporal features
from these routes. The following 9 features were extracted
from both set of routes for training the machine learning
models: max and min acceleration, mean and standard devia-
tion of accelerations, mean and standard deviation of absolute
accelerations, maximum speed, idle time and distance traveled.
The models were built and the predictions were averaged over
1000 iterations. In each iteration, 90% of the dataset from each
set were randomly chosen for training data, and the remaining
10% from each set were test data.
Table V shows the list of algorithms that were evaluated and
their prediction accuracies for the ‘Real’ and ‘Synthetic’ test
trajectories. Note that in our context, the ideal results should
be a 50-50 split, i.e., 50% of ‘Real’ routes are predicted as
‘Synthetic’ and 50% of ‘Synthetic’ routes are predicted as
‘Real’. We can observe that most algorithms (except Decision
Trees) have an average prediction accuracy of close to 50%.
Three of those algorithms (Naive Bayes, Neural Network and
SVM) display results biased towards one of the two classifiers
implying that the models had difficulty predicting the correct
classifier and defaulted to one classifier. The Decision Trees
algorithm could detect ≈ 62% of the ‘Synthetic’ trajectories as
synthetic. The ensemble classifier of Decision Trees, Random
Forest, could detect ≈ 63% of the ‘Synthetic’ trajectories as
synthetic. These numbers also do not signify large detection
rate for our synthetic trajectories. We must note that this
evaluation is preliminary as 800 routes do not suffice for these
algorithms to build generalized models from training data, and
the models may be subject to overfitting. We intend to extend
our dataset in the future to incorporate more routes and run
this evaluation again for more generalized models.
VII. RELATED WORK
A large body of research has focused on mitigating location
and other private information leakage attacks on Android
devices. Most of these works are orthogonal to our system as
their motivation and techniques differ. Examples of such work
include, but are not limited to, recommending new frame-
works/privacy metrics [35], [25], [36], [37], [38], [39], [40],
location obfuscation [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], location cloaking
[6], generating dummy locations [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [41],
tainting sensitive data [42], [43], dynamic analysis [44], [45],
static code analysis [46], [47], [48], [49], permissions analysis
[50], and application retrofitting [51], [52], [53].
Synthesizing human mobility has also been studied in the
context of opportunistic networks [54], [55], [56], [57], ad-hoc
and vehicular wireless networks [58], [59], [60], [61], commu-
nity based mobility models [62], [63], [64], [65], predicting
location of moving objects [66], [67], and implementing
efficient location update mechanisms [68], [69], [70], [71].
Some research has also focused on generating synthetic traces
for user privacy [21], [23], [24], however, these works have
limitations that can enable an adversary to detect fake traces.
None of the above works satisfy traffic constraints for different
roads at different times of the day, nor take into account the
statistical properties of user driving behavior. For example,
[23], [68] simply superimpose speed patterns from real routes
on synthetic traces based on the street type without accounting
for traffic conditions of the road. These speed patterns can
also be repeated and can be detected. Bindschaedler and
Shokri [21] generate synthetic traces that are derived from
seed datasets of real traces which does not apply in our context
of generating completely synthetic identities for users. Their
work is also not scalable globally due to their reliance of real
datasets, while ours can easily scale since map data for any
location of the world is readily available.
Beresford et al. [72] implemented MockDroid, a modified
version of Android 2.2.1 with a user controlled permissions
manager. The system allowed users to define mock permis-
sions for installed apps. The location mock permission was
implemented to block all location fixes from reaching the
app simulating a lack of available location information. The
authors ran the system on 27 apps and showed that most
apps continued to function with reduced functionality. This
work is similar to the current Android permissions model and,
therefore, subject to the weaknesses in Android’s permission
model that we have addressed with MATRIX.
Agarwal and Hall [73] implemented ProtectMyPrivacy
(PMP) for iOS jailbroken devices that intercepted method
calls accessing user’s private data, and allowed the user to
substitute anonymized data in place of the real information.
The limitations of this work are: (1) the anonymized data is
provided by the user at run-time which may be completely ran-
dom and unrealistic, and (2) the app’s functionality is paused
for user input which is detrimental to user experience and
possibly also to the app’s functionality. The above limitations
are addressed by MATRIX through the seamless delivery of
realistic synthetic locations to apps without requiring constant
interaction with the user.
Liu et al. [74] implemented Personalized Privacy Assistant
(PPA) for rooted Android devices. This system is a modified
App Ops permission manager that displays an app’s recent
requests and the frequencies of requests in the past 7 days.
The system uses this information to generate daily privacy
nudges to motivate users to interact and change their privacy
settings. We believe that this information provided to users
is not sufficient to make any kind of privacy-aware decisions.
Additional context is required to determine if an app is misus-
ing the information (e.g., time and duration of those requests,
was the app in the background?). PrivoScope addresses the
limitations by providing much more context to the users and
displaying them in a way that it is easier for the users to grasp
and visualize these accesses.
Zheng et al. [61] propose an agenda driven mobility model
that considers a person’s daily social activities for motion gen-
eration. They derive this agenda from the National Household
Travel Survey (NHTS) database by the U.S. Department of
Transportation. The first agenda and all subsequent activities
are based on the NHTS activity distribution, and addresses are
picked at random from many addresses for the corresponding
activity. The start time of the first agenda determines the sched-
ule for the entire day and each activity starts immediately after
the mean dwell time+longest transition time from previous
activity. The route between two activities assumes a longest
possible time given by the Dijkstra’s algorithm. This work
has several limitations (all addressed by MATRIX) that are
trivial to detect: (1) the addresses are picked at random without
accounting for distances (e.g., gas station may be miles away
from regular route), (2) the routes do not incorporate any traffic
information and are always static, and (3) the routes do not
incorporate any driving behavior and likely assume a constant
speed of motion.
Fawaz and Shin [35] implemented LP-Guardian, a privacy
protection framework modifying the Android source code. The
framework changes location granularity of installed apps based
on the threat posed by the app and its location granularity
requirements. It automatically coarsens the location to a city
level if it identifies a request from an A&A library, the app is
in the background, or the app is a weather app. It synthesizes
the location for fitness apps but preserves features of the actual
route such as the distance traveled. The framework supplies a
synthetic location if it determines that it is not safe to release
the location. This work has the following limitations that are
addressed in MATRIX: (1) the preservation of route features
can lead to inference of the user’s real locations, and (2) unless
chosen very carefully, the synthetic traces generated from real
features will not snap to streets (e.g., different street lengths
and curvatures) and can be detected as synthetic.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We presented MATRIX, a system that addresses current
privacy protection weaknesses in Android, provides users with
a tool to analyze how apps access their private information,
and the capability to provide obfuscated/synthetic data to
untrusted apps. We demonstrated that MATRIX is portable to
most Android devices globally, is reliable, has low-overhead,
and generates privacy-preserving synthetic trajectories that are
difficult to differentiate from real mobility trajectories by an
adversary.
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